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Much of Western European history conditions us to see human differences in simplistic opposition to each 
other: dominant/ subordinate, good/bad, up/down, superior/inferior. In a society where the good is defined 
in terms of profit rather than in terms of human need, there must always be some group of people who, 
through systematized oppression, can be made to feel surplus, to occupy the place of the dehumanized 
inferior. Within this society, that group is made up of black and third world people, working class people, 
older people and women.   
 
Institutionalized rejection of difference is an absolute necessity in a profit economy which needs 
outsiders as surplus people. As members of such an economy, we have all been programmed to respond to 
the human differences between us with fear and loathing and to handle that difference in one of three 
ways: ignore it, and if that is not possible, copy it if we think it is dominant, or destroy it if we think it is 
subordinate. But we have no patterns for relating across our human differences as equals. As a result, those 
differences have been misnamed and misused in the service of separation and confusion.  
 
Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider1 
A spectre is haunting American legal education—the spectre of critical legal studies. This 
rapidly expanding reform movement within elite institutions of legal pedagogy is principally a 
significant response to the crisis of purpose among law professors and students. Like liberation 
theologians in seminaries, social medicine proponents in medical schools, radical deconstructionists 
in university literature departments, and opposition postmodern critics in the arts, critical legal 
theorists fundamentally question the dominant and usually liberal paradigms prevalent and pervasive 
in American culture and society. This thorough questioning is not primarily a constructive attempt 
to put forward a conception of a new legal and social order. Rather, it is a pronounced disclosure of 
the inconsistencies, incoherences, silences, and blindness of legal formalists, legal positivists, and legal 
realists in the liberal tradition. Critical legal studies is more a concerted attack and assault on the 
                                                            
1 A. LOURDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984). 
legitimacy and authority of pedagogical strategies in law schools than a comprehensive 
announcement of what a credible and realizable new society and legal system would look like.  
In this essay, I shall situate the critical legal studies movement within the context of the 
larger crisis of purpose among intellectuals and academicians in contemporary American society. I 
will examine the critical legal studies movement as a significant and insightful, though flawed, 
response to this crisis of purpose. Then I shall suggest how the critical legal studies movement can 
become a more effective prophetic force in our time.  
Allen Bloom's best-seller, The Closing of the American Mind2—a nostalgic and, for some, a 
seductive depiction of the decline and decay of the elitist, highbrow, classical humanist tradition in 
institutions of higher education—and Russell Jacoby's The Last Intellectuals3—a sentimental requiem 
for leftist public intellectuals—are both emblematic symptoms of the larger crisis of purpose in the 
academy."4 For Bloom, critical legal studies would be viewed as an attempt to highlight the racism, 
patriarchy, and class skewed character of the classical tradition that he defends. Critical legal studies 
for Bloom would be simply another instance of what he calls the "Nietzschenization of the American 
left"—his way of describing the American left as an irrational movement.5 For Jacoby, critical legal 
studies constitutes an example of academic leftists who refuse to intervene into the larger public 
conversation concerning the destiny of the country. Yet both Bloom and Jacoby are silent on the 
                                                            
2 A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987) 
 
3 R. JACOBY, THE LAST INTELLECTUALS (1987) 
 
4 These texts are written from different vantage points—Bloom being a Strausian, Jacoby being a neo- or even post-
Marxist. 
 
5 For Bloom, looking at the critical legal studies movement through the lens of Leo Strauss and his own creative 
appropriation of the work of Strauss, critical legal studies would be simply this Nietzschenized left—highly irrational, 
cantankerous, and rebellious but without real intellectual substance and content. 
major challenge of academic left subcultures like critical legal studies: the complex operations of 
power enacted in the styles and standards, values and sensibilities, moods and manners, grids of 
seeing and structures of feelings, into which students are socialized and acculturated.  
Critical legal theorists focus on the kinds of dispositions and the forms of discourse: but 
where do they gain their legitimacy? What makes them more acceptable than other kinds of styles, 
other kinds of grids, other kinds of structures of feelings6 in the culture of critical discourse?  
Based in part on the pioneering work of Michel Foucault,7 oppositional intellectuals, 
including critical legal theorists, are not simply contesting prevailing paradigms in the academy, they 
are also investigating the historical origins and social functions of the kinds of standards and criteria 
used to evaluate paradigms, arguments, and perspectives in the culture of critical discourse. They 
must be able to construct a genealogy of the culture of critical discourse itself: when it emerges, what 
justifies the kind of standards invoked, and how those standards have changed over time. They are 
not merely displacing prevailing paradigms with new ones, but are raising deeper questions about the 
very standards and criteria themselves. These investigations highlight the often concealed ideological 
assumptions, the exclusions of certain styles of argument,8 and the arbitrary character of the concrete 
results (as embodied in curricula and enshrined in exemplary legal scholarship). This kind of 
                                                            
6 By structures of feelings, I refer to the very intermediate levels of the existence in the culture of critical discourse. This 
"structure of feelings" is a term from the late Raymond Williams. Williams was trying to describe a mode of being in a 
culture which is different from that which one had experienced before entry into this culture of critical discourse in the 
academy. See, e.g., R. WILLIAMS, MODERN TRAGEDY (1966).  
 
7 See M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977); Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 
CRITICAL INQUIRY (1982); FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS & OTHER 
WRITINGS 1972-1977 (1980). 
 
8 An example is that propositional forms have more status as opposed to narrative forms, and the issue then becomes why 
stories have less status than propositional forms of argument. Oppositional intellectuals question where that value 
originates. 
intellectual interrogation is, in many ways, unprecedented in the academy because it not only 
criticizes paradigms, arguments, and perspectives but, more pointedly, it calls into question the very 
grounds upon which acceptable paradigms, good arguments, and legitimate perspectives are judged. 
This radical questioning views the present institutional arrangements of legal scholarship and 
education, along with their mediated link to the liberal status quo, as themselves impediments to the 
production of new perspectives and paradigms which are worthy of acceptance.  
In short, academic left subcultures such as critical legal studies put forward 
metaphilosophical and meta-institutional inquiries that cast suspicion on the capacity of the 
academy to satisfy the conditions required for undistorted dialogue and uncoerced intellectual 
exchange. This incapacity exists precisely because of the ways in which the culture of critical 
discourse is already implicated in the ideological battles raging in society-at-large, ensconced in the 
political struggles of the day and partisan in these battles and struggles. These metaphilosophical and 
meta-institutional inquiries are primarily attempts to show how the forms of rationality dominant in 
the academy—and regulating of the practices of most academicians—are value-laden, ideologically-
loaded, and historically contingent. In this way, critical legal theorists highlight the arbitrary content 
and character of the standards, styles, curriculum, concepts (for example, rules of law), and 
conclusions of legal scholarship and education.  
Like Foucault, critical legal theorists examine diverse and multiple "micro-physics of 
power"—Foucault's term for the ways in which societies preserve themselves partly by encouraging 
intellectuals to be unmindful of how they are socialized and acculturated into the prevailing "regimes 
of truth."9 They overlook and ignore the ways in which the prevailing culture of critical discourse 
remains uncritical about itself, the ways in which the very invoking of relentless criticism, and how, 
in fact, the predominant quest for truth remains untruthful about itself. A first step toward a more 
thorough critique and a more truthful quest for truth is to accent the way dominant discourses 
construct regulative identities, forms of argument, modes of presentation, and ideological outlooks 
that preclude taking seriously alternative, and especially oppositional, identities, types of 
argumentation, and political perspectives held by those viewed as other, alien, marginal, and 
unconventional. This unprecedented kind of critique of the culture of critical discourse in the 
academy promotes a full-fledged historicist orientation and an explicit encounter with social theory. 
By historicist orientation, I mean the provisional, tentative, and revisable character of formulations 
that reflect the state of political and ideological conflict in society at a particular moment.10 By an 
explicit encounter with social theory, I mean the particular understandings of the structural 
constraints—those of the state, economy, and culture- that shape and are shaped by legal practices. 
Needless to say, the critical legal studies movement focuses on how the undeniable realities of class 
exploitation, racial subjugation, patriarchal domination, and homophobic marginalization affect the 
making and enforcement of legal sanctions. Until now, legal discourse has not really focused on 
these issues. In the name of criticism, it has remained silent about objects that require serious critical 
investigation—the way in which the law has been shaped by Jim Crowism, the way it has been 
                                                            
9 "Regimes of truth" are the various ways in which distinctions between true and false, and legitimate and illegitimate are 
put forward, and ways in which these regimes of truth themselves have to be legitimate. Of course, one must then ask the 
next question: Who is going to legitimate the legitimators? This is ultimately, for critical legal studies, a political 
question. 
 
10 For example, the reason that a greater number of women attend law school today as opposed to previously reflects the 
larger political and ideological struggles that have transpired since the 1960s. 
 
shaped by patriarchal forms of relations both in the private sphere and in the public sphere, and the 
way it has been shaped by the marginalization of gays and lesbians and so forth.  
In the past, legal formalism and legal positivism have resisted the serious challenge of this 
kind of historicist and theoretical focus. Legal realism—that powerful pragmatic perspective 
inaugurated by Oliver Holmes and enacted in the works of Felix Cohen and others11—took an 
important step in this historicist and theoretical direction. Yet its amorphous notion of "experience" 
remained confined to immediate problems and practical solutions rather than structural deficiencies 
and fundamental transformative possibilities of society. In this way, critical legal studies goes far 
beyond earlier attempts to highlight the contingent character of the law. Academic left subcultures 
like critical legal studies tend to respond to the crisis of purpose among intellectuals by projecting the 
role of social critic within critical discourse. Such a role requires that one be equipped with not only 
a sense of history, but also with a broad knowledge of history—especially the new social histories 
that focus on those on the underside of traditional views of history. To be a social critic in legal 
discourse also requires that one be well-grounded in the classical and oppositional traditions of social 
theory—Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Lukàcs, De Beauvoir, Du Bois, Parsons, Gouldner, 
Habermas, and others. And, of course, one must be well-versed in the past and present forms of legal 
discourse.  
                                                            
11 See, e.g., Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Llewellyn, A 
Realistic Jurisprudence, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431(1930). 
 
I find the notion of legal scholar as social critic-best seen in the works of the late Robert 
Cover12—to be highly attractive. Yet to be a sophisticated and effective social critic requires 
intellectual and existential sources that fall far outside those provided by a typical elite undergraduate 
education and law school training. The major flaws of most of the work done by critical legal studies 
can be attributed to this truncated education and training. I shall examine briefly three basic flaws in 
the critical legal studies movement: the first is a dominant tendency to "trash" liberalism;13 the 
second, a refusal to come to terms with tradition as both an impediment and impetus to social 
change; and the third, cultural distance from nonacademic prophetic and progressive organized 
efforts to transform American culture and society.  
I have never fully understood the animosity and hostility toward liberalism displayed in 
much of the writings of critical legal theorists.14  I find many of their criticisms of liberalism 
persuasive—such as the ways in which the language of impartiality, objective due process, and value-
free procedure hides and conceals partisan operations of power and elite forms of social 
victimization. Yet the hostility may itself conceal a deeper existential dimension of the critical legal 
studies movement: namely, the degree to which it is a revolt against the liberalism of elite law 
schools. To put it more pointedly, most first-generation critical legal theorists are rebellious students 
of major liberal legal thinkers. And, like all such affairs, the central object of critique implicitly 
                                                            
12 The work of Robert Cover, a former professor of law at Yale University, was not simply interdisciplinary but de-
disciplinizing. The very notion of "interdisciplinary" assumes that there are still such things as disciplines against which 
one traverses. De-disciplinizing assumes that one moves toward a problematic view and pulls from whatever sources are 
instructive, whether those sources be Marx, Old Testament studies, Judaic theology, popular culture, Kafka, Proust, or 
whatever.  
 
13 By "trashing" liberalism, I mean to delegitimate and demystify it and to describe it as just a cover for power. 
 
14 See, for example, the works of Duncan Kennedy, David Trubeck, and Mark Tushnet. 
 
affects the very critique itself. My hunch is that one discernible effect is to fan and fuel, accentuate 
and exaggerate the ideological distance between the fathers and the progeny.  
This distance has now become a rather nasty point of contention and confrontation due to 
the political polarization between the critical legal scholars and their critics in many law schools. 
What was once a rather mild Oedipus family romance has turned into a Clausewitzian affair, given 
the fierce struggle over tenure slots, administrative power, curriculum, and influence. The "trashing" 
of liberalism has played a noteworthy role in this escalating battle. On the other hand, serious 
conflict and contestation is inevitable between those who question the very rules of the game and 
those who claim that this interrogation itself is a rejection of the noble ends and aims of legal 
education.15 In this sense, academic left subcultures of any sort are critical of the liberal academy. On 
the other hand, to "trash" liberalism as a political ideology in the modern world is to overlook its 
revolutionary beginnings and opposition potential—despite its dominant versions and uses to 
preserve the status quo. To ignore the ambitious legacy of liberalism and thereby downplay its grand 
achievements is to be not only historically forgetful but also politically naive. It is not only to throw 
the baby out with the bath water, but also to pull the rug from under the very feet of those who are 
struggling for prophetic social change.16 Crucial aspects of liberalism inform and inspire much of the 
oppositional left activities here and around the world. To see solely the ways in which dominant 
versions of liberalism domesticate and dilute such oppositional activities is to view liberalism in too 
                                                            
15 For example, Richard Posner, Robert Bork, and others view critical legal studies as calling into question the very ends 
of Western civilization and the ends of traditional legal education. Thus, they conclude it ought to be pushed outside the 
academy completely. 
 
16 While liberalism in America is associated with the status quo, in South Africa, for example, it is still a revolutionary 
ideology. 
 
monolithic and homogeneous a manner.17 Unlike the powerful yet unpersuasive antiliberal 
perspectives of Alasdair MacIntyre18 and the insightful yet unclear postliberal viewpoints of many 
critical legal theorists, I simply cannot conceive of an intellectually compelling, morally desirable, 
and practically realizable prophetic social vision, strategy, and program that does not take certain 
achievements of liberalism as a starting point. Reconceptualization of political obligation, 
participatory citizenship, and redistribution of wealth by civil and legal means indeed are required in 
a revising of this liberal starting point—yet this constitutes a radical democratic interpretation of 
liberalism, not a total discarding of it. In this sense, liberalism is an unfinished project arrested by 
relatively unaccountable corporate power, a passive and depoliticized citizenry, and a cultural 
conservatism of racism, patriarchy, homophobia, and narrow patriotism or neonationalism. In other 
words, leftist oppositional thought and practice should build on the best of liberalism, yet transform 
liberalism in a more democratic and egalitarian manner.  
In his recent book, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Alasdair Macintyre19 laments the fact 
that "the contemporary debates within modern political systems are almost exclusively between 
conservative liberals, liberal liberals, and radical liberals. There is little place in such political systems 
for the criticism of the system itself, that is, for putting liberalism in question.20  Yet after his 
                                                            
17 One danger in "trashing" liberalism is that it discourages historical analysis of liberalism's various forms. For example, 
although John Dewey was a democratic socialist for sixty-five of his ninety-two years, many think of him as just a liberal. 
His works, The Public and Its Problems and Liberalism and Social Action, go unread. See J. DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS 
PROBLEM (1927); J. DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION (1935). The political danger in "trashing" liberalism is 
that for people attempting to free themselves from institutional and structural forms of evil, liberalism might be a 
valuable resource they can invoke. 
 
18 See, e.g., A. MACINTRYE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981). 
 
19 A. Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (soon to be published). 
 
20  Id. at 392 
 
interesting and insightful reconstruction of the conceptions of practical rationality that inform the 
notions of justice in the Aristotelian, Augustinian, Thomistic, and Humean traditions, Macintyre 
provides us with no clue as to what a constructive antiliberal proposal for justice would be like. 
Similarly, much of the provocative and penetrating criticisms of liberalism put forward by critical 
legal theorists gives us little sense of what a desirable postliberal society would look like. The recent 
trilogy of Roberto Unger, Politics Toward a Reconstructive Social Theory,21 indeed attempts to meet 
this challenge—and it is not surprising that he dubs his project a "superliberal" one which tries to 
capture the utopian, experimental, and democratic impulse that informed the early stages of liberal 
thought and practice.22 
The second criticism of critical legal studies is its refusal to acknowledge the equivocal 
character of tradition. The powerful demystifying and deconstructive strategies of critical legal 
theorists tend to promote and encourage enlightenment attitudes toward tradition-that is, the notion 
that tradition is to be exclusively identified with ignorance and intolerance, prejudice and 
parochialism, dogmatism and docility. Yet as Hans-Georg Gadamer,23 Edward Shils,24 Antonio 
Gramsci,25 and Raymond Williams26 have shown, tradition can also be a source for insight and 
intelligence, rationality and resistance, critique and contestation. Partly owing to the available 
options in legal education, critical legal theorists tend to respond to liberalism's hegemony in the 
                                                            
21 R. UNGER, POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987). 
 
22 This represents a major shift from his earlier work, especially Knowledge and Politics, in which he "trashed" liberalism. 
See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1984). 
 
23 H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1976). 
 
24 E. SHILS, TRADITION (1981) 
 
25 A. GRAMSCI, THE MODERN PRINCE AND OTHER WRITINGS (1957); A. GRAMSCI, LETTERS FROM PRISON (1973). 
 
26 See R. Williams, supra  note 6 
 
academy by disclosing the various exclusions of the liberal traditions rather than reconstructing the 
creative ways in which oppressed and marginalized persons have forged traditions of resistance by 
appropriating aspects of liberalism for democratic and egalitarian ends. These appropriations not 
only force us to acknowledge the dynamic, malleable, and revisable character of a diverse liberal 
tradition, they also compel us to accent the way in which this tradition is fused with other 
oppositional traditions such as civil republican, communitarian, and democratic socialist traditions 
of subaltern peoples. In this regard, the relative silence of critical legal theorists regarding the 
constructive attempts of serious left thinkers in oppositional traditions—as opposed to the 
deconstruction of the canonical texts of the white liberal fathers—is quite revealing.27 Needless to 
say, both activities are needed—yet a balance is required.  
This imbalance is related to my third criticism: the paucity of sustained reflection by critical 
legal theorists regarding strategies and tactics for effective social change in the larger culture and 
society.  By remaining captive to an implicit Foucaultian outlook—namely, enacting resistance in 
the form of incisive genealogies of the emergence of partisan and power—concealing liberal legal 
discourses that purport to be impartial, objective, and fair—critical legal thinkers usually have little 
to say about how this resistance can be linked to struggles for social change outside of the academy. 
As Foucaultian "specific intellectuals" who rest content with contesting the prevailing "regimes of 
truth" within their academic context, critical legal theorists do not specify how their significant 
                                                            
27 For example, while Malcolm X talked about Afro-Americans being victims of American democracy, just as the 
indigenous peoples of this country were victims of American democracy, the arguments that he put forth over and 
against America were nonetheless democratic arguments. This oppositional tradition is oftentimes ignored because it 
adds something else. It begins with "my condition, my culture which has been devalued and degraded" and so forth; it 
then links this into a discourse appropriated in part from the dominant tradition and systems. Of course, Martin Luther 
King, Jr., was a master at this movement, invoking both the very ideals of the country that victimized him and those 
with whom he was concerned. 
effects of pedagogical reform are related to progressive activities of struggling peoples in nonacademic 
contexts. My claim is simply that the relative neglect of interest in and the interrogation of traditions 
of resistance of subaltern peoples encourages a lack of concern about and attention to strategies of 
social change beyond the academy. Note that I am not describing the intentions and aspirations of 
the critical legal studies movement, but rather the dominant practices of most of its figures.  
My criticisms of this movement-put forward in a spirit of intellectual sympathy and political 
support—reflect a disenchantment with its Foucaultian orientation. These criticisms can be met best 
by a broadening of this orientation into a Gramscian perspective.28 Such a perspective requires that 
critical legal theorists become public intellectuals—that is, thinkers who make significant 
interventions into the larger conversation that bears more directly on the destiny of American 
society. For too long critical legal theorists have put forward primarily academic critiques of the 
academy—critiques that further extend the authority of the academy while they attempt to 
delegitimate the academy. The paradoxical effects of these critiques inscribe the critical legal studies 
movement more deeply within the limits of the very academic styles and ethos it purports to change. 
There surely is some significance to these critiques, yet they remain highly limited without 
elaboration of their implications in the public sphere of intellectual exchange. Such an elaboration 
would result in the emergence of visible critical legal studies figures comparable to Noam Chomsky 
or Edward Said29—that is, figures who put forward views with which the larger society would have 
to reckon.  
                                                            
28 See A. Gramsci, supra note 25. Antonio Gramsci ranks among the most significant cultural theorists in the early part 
of the twentieth century. He produced a great deal of his writing while in Mussolini's prisons in Italy. 
 
29 See E. SAID, THE WORLD, THE TEXT, AND THE CRITIC (1983). 
A Gramscian perspective also would require that critical legal studies attempt to become 
more grounded in the progressive sectors of the black, Latino, feminist, gay, lesbian, and trade union 
resistance efforts. This attempt to become more organic with traditions of resistance should be a 
mutually critical and empowering process. My hunch and hope is that one significant result of this 
process is that the critical legal studies movement will become more conscious of race and gender 
bias, homophobia, and nonacademic political struggle (as well as more appreciative of the 
oppositional potential of the liberal tradition) and that progressive black, Latino, feminist, gay, 
lesbian, and trade union groups will become more cognizant of demystifying, deconstructive, and 
class strategies of thought and action. This kind of mutual learning and solidarity building facilitates 
the shedding of intellectual parochialism and the overcoming of political isolation-a plight and 
predicament shared by most progressive groups and academic left subcultures like the critical legal 
studies movement.  
In conclusion, a Gramscian perspective is more easily enunciated than enacted, and the 
implicit Foucaultian orientation of most critical legal studies figures impedes such an enactment. 
Furthermore, the vast depoliticization of the American populace and the minimal financial resources 
for creating and sustaining mobilizing and organizing efforts contribute to the unlikelihood of the 
emergence of insurgent progressive social movements. Yet the prevailing desperation and even 
desolation of the American left—both in and out of the academy—is no excuse for isolation and 
insularity. Rather, it makes even more imperative efforts regulated by a Gramscian perspective.  
The critical legal studies movement is one sign of hope in a period of widespread narrow 
conservatism, nationalism, cynicism, and defeatism. But its intellectual and political potential 
remains truncated as long as it refuses to make a Gramscian leap into an unpredictable future.  
